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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
One of the important lessons from the 2007-2009 financial crisis is that systemic risk and 
spillover effects are significantly underestimated in most widely used risk measures and 
that standard risk measurement instruments, such as  value-at-risk (VaR), need to be 
adjusted to adequately reflect overall risk. In this paper, we propose a state-dependent 
sensitivity (SDS) VaR for quantifying risk spillovers among sets of different financial 
institutions.   We estimate a system of quantile regressions for four sets of financial 
institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies), 
in which each type of financial institution is represented by an index of several firms. In 
addition, our empirical model explicitly accounts  for  the  effects  of  different  market  
states  (tranquil,  normal,  and  volatile)  on  the magnitude of risk spillovers. We trace out 
the time path of how shocks move through the system using impulse response functions. 
The SDSVaR model explicitly reveals the magnitude of risk spillovers at a certain point in 
time. Moreover, in contrast to dynamic correlations, we are able to obtain the direction of 
spillovers from one set of institutions to another. Hence, the approach permits a 
delineation of spillover effects from shocks affecting the financial sector as a whole. 
 
As opaque and highly leveraged investment partnerships, hedge funds recently received 
attention as a potential source of contagion, a transmission channel of risk between 
different asset classes and as a potential amplifier of systemic risk in financial markets. If 
highly leveraged hedge funds are forced to liquidate large position at fire-sale prices, 
counterparties sustain heavy losses. This may lead to further defaults or  threaten 
systemically important institutions not only directly as counterparties or creditors but also 
indirectly through asset price adjustments (Bernanke, 2006). 
 
While most observers tend to agree that hedge funds have some systemic importance, 
little  evidence exists on the magnitude of potential spillover effects. In this paper we 
provide the first empirical estimates of the size of intra-month  spillover effects from 
hedge funds to other financial institutions. 
 
In contrast to other recently proposed measures (e.g. Adrian and Brunnermeier 2010), the 
SDSVaR proposed in this paper models the distribution of the value-at-risk. After 
calculating the VaR for each set of institutions, we regress these VaRs over the whole 
range of quantiles on each other, i.e. we regress the VaR of investment banks on the VaR 
of commercial banks, hedge funds and insurance companies. The important point is that 
movements in the VaR change with the financial health of an institution. During tranquil 
market times, i.e. high quantiles of the VaR distribution, when institutions have plenty of 
cushion to absorb shocks, risk spillover between financial institutions are likely to be 
marginal. When the financial crisis hit in 2007 the behavior of the VaR changed 
dramatically. The higher risk faced in the market not only sent the VaR strongly negative, 
i.e. low quantiles of VaR distribution, but also caused the VaR to be more volatile. During this period dormant linkages that were building up during tranquil periods became 
suddenly visible and led to high spillovers. 
 
Specifically, during normal market times, a one percentage point increase in the VaR of 
hedge funds is estimated to increase the VaR of investment banks by 0.09 percentage 
points. The same shock, however, increases the VaR of the investment bank industry by 
0.71 percentage points during times of financial distress. Similarly, during normal times a 
one percent increase in the value-at-risk of commercial banks leads to a 0.01 percentage 
point increase in the VaR of investment banks. In times of financial distress the spillovers 
from commercial banks to investment banks increases to 0.05 percentage points. We 
obtain similar magnitudes for spillovers from investments banks to other financial 
institutions, while insurance companies tend to exhibit few spillover effects, even in crisis 
times. Hence, while spillover effects increase overall, hedge fund spillovers to other 
financial institutions increase by much more and are of a much higher economic 
significance. 
 
The findings support initiatives as in Lo (2008), who in his testimony for the U.S. House of 
Representatives emphasizes that hedge funds should be required to provide more 
information on a confidential basis to regulators in order to enable them to more 
accurately assess the risks in the financial sector. They also suggest that limiting 
supervision and regulation to depository institutions may be misguided. 1 
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Spillover Effects among Financial Institutions: A State-
Dependent Sensitivity Value-at-Risk  Approach 
Abstract 
In this paper, we develop a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) approach that 
enables us to quantify the direction, size, and duration of risk spillovers among financial 
institutions as a function of the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile). 
Within a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial institutions 
(commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) we show that 
while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects in 
volatile market periods. Commercial banks and, especially, hedge funds appear to play a 
major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions. Using daily data, we 
can trace out the spillover effects over time in a set of impulse response functions and find 
that they reach their peak after 10 to 15 days. 
Keywords: Risk  spillovers;  state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR); 
quantile regression; financial institutions; hedge funds 
JEL-Classification:  G01, G10, G24 3 
“Continued focus on counterparty risk management is likely the best course 
for addressing systemic concerns related to hedge funds.” 
Ben S. Bernanke (2006) 
I.  Introduction 
One of the important lessons from the 2007-2009 financial crisis is that systemic risk and 
spillover effects are significantly underestimated in most widely used risk measures and that 
standard risk measurement instruments, such as value-at-risk (VaR), need to be adjusted to 
adequately reflect overall risk. In this paper, we propose a state-dependent sensitivity (SDS) VaR 
for quantifying risk spillovers among sets of different financial institutions.
1 We estimate a 
system of quantile regressions for four sets of financial institutions (commercial banks, 
investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies), in which each type of financial 
institution is represented by an index of several firms. In addition, our empirical model explicitly 
accounts for the effects of different market states (tranquil, normal, and volatile) on the 
magnitude of risk spillovers. We trace out the time path of how shocks move through the system 
using impulse response functions. The SDSVaR model explicitly reveals the magnitude of risk 
spillovers at time t. Moreover, in contrast to dynamic correlations, we are able to obtain the 
direction of spillovers from one set of institutions to another. Hence, the approach permits a 
delineation of spillover effects from shocks affecting the financial sector as a whole. 
We show that while small during normal times, equivalent shocks lead to considerable 
spillover effects in volatile market periods. For instance, during normal market times, a one 
percentage point increase in the VaR of hedge funds is estimated to increase the VaR of 
investment banks by 0.09 percentage points. The same shock, however, increases the VaR of the 
                                                 
1 We define a risk spillover as a shock in the VaR of one financial institution that is transmitted to the VaR 
of another financial institution 4 
investment bank industry by 0.71 percentage points during times of financial distress. Similarly, 
during normal times a one percent increase in the value-at-risk of commercial banks leads to a 
0.01 percentage point increase in the VaR of investment banks. In times of financial distress the 
spillovers from commercial banks to investment banks increases to 0.05 percentage points. 
Overall, we make four main contributions to the literature. First, our two-stage quantile 
regression approach permits an identification of spillover effects as opposed to common shocks 
affecting the entire financial system. Second, we use the identification of directional shocks to 
document differences in their magnitude moving from tranquil to crisis times. Third, the results 
suggest that hedge funds may play an even more prominent role as amplifiers of systemic risk 
than previously thought. And fourth, the econometric approach allows us to quantify intra-month 
spillover effects between different sets of financial institutions. 
The paper is related to Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2010) CoVaR approach. However, we 
focus on spillover effects among financial institutions, rather than the contributions of financial 
institutions to systemic risk. We furthermore apply a more flexible methodology that allows for 
the fact that spillovers are determined simultaneously and that explicitly measures the spillover 
effects during a crisis. The quantile regression setup and the dynamic structure of the model are 
inspired by Engle and Manganelli’s (2004) CAViaR model. 
The SDSVaR model proposed in this paper is an indirect approach to measuring spillover 
risk. Relevant determinants such as direct linkages between institutions, leverage, liquidity, and 
hedge funds’ asset holdings are not available on a daily basis, so that we cannot explain the 
underlying economic relationships of risk spillovers. Our empirical approach comes with some 
limitations. Certain types of exposure between financial institutions will not be detected. First, 
our approach requires the presence of a shock in the value-at-risk of one institution. For instance, 5 
when prime brokers tightened margin requirements for hedge funds in 2008, they most likely had 
an impact on the risk of hedge funds. Thus, hedge funds were exposed to investment banks but 
the lack of a shock in the VaR of investment banks prevents us from measuring this type of 
exposure. Second, our analysis is based on daily data which allows us to measure the immediate 
responses (those that occur within the same day or the next day) but leaves spillovers with a 
longer propagation lag undetected.
2 This means that our spillover estimates presented in the 
empirical part do not necessarily reflect the historically observed order with which financial 
institutions affected each other. Finally, certain types of exposure require investors to be 
informed about their presence. For instance, the exposure of many banks to AIG via CDS 
contracts was basically unknown to investors and was only revealed after AIG’s bailout in 
September 2008, when a list of banks that benefited most of the rescue package was published. 
On the other hand, the main spillover mechanism that has been proposed in the recent 
literature on systemic risk, the one we have in mind in this paper, does not require any 
knowledge on the side of market participants. The loss and margin spirals described in 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) generate spillovers 
and externalities purely through the actions and loss reactions of financial institutions. For 
instance, a hedge fund facing margin calls is forced to sell assets in order to raise the required 
cash but the additional supply that the fund injects in the market depresses prices further which 
may lead to margin calls for other financial institutions. The empirical approach used in this 
paper is ideally suited in such an environment. It measures the size, the direction, and the 
                                                 
2 In a previous version of this paper we also tried measuring spillovers with monthly data. The results, 
however, were inconclusive. It seems that the additional observations from the daily frequency are needed to 
estimate spillovers in the tails of the distribution. 6 
persistency of responses given a shock in one financial institution. Measuring spillovers through 
daily value-at-risk has a number of other advantages. In particular, it may capture risks that arise 
from relationships among financial institutions that may go beyond those reflected in simple 
accounting variables. For instance, an article in The Economist from August 9, 2007, describes 
the complex relationship between the three major prime brokers (Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, and, at that time, Bear Stearns) and hedge funds. Investment banks that own corporate 
bonds may use the swap market to hedge against corporate defaults. But if hedge funds take the 
other side of the swap and at the same time depend on loans from the same bank, the spillover 
risk between the bank and the hedge fund increases. These types of spillover effects, to the extent 
that they are known to the market, would be fully reflected in our estimates. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section places the paper into 
the literature. Section III explains our SDSVaR approach of modeling spillover effects. Section 
IV presents the data and the main empirical results.
3 Section V gives some concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Previous Literature 
As opaque and highly leveraged investment partnerships, hedge funds have received 
prominent attention as a potential source of contagion, a transmission channel of risk between 
different financial institutions, and potential amplifiers of systemic risk in financial markets. If 
highly leveraged hedge funds are forced to liquidate large position at fire-sale prices, 
                                                 
3 Since transparency and representativeness are a major concern when working with financial data in general 
and hedge funds in particular, we provide a detailed appendix available at 
http://www.sbf.unisg.ch/en/Lehrstuehle/Lehrstuhl_Fuess/Homepage_Fuess/~/media/Internet/Content/Dateien/Institu
teUndCenters/SBF/Papers/Internet_Appendix_Adams_Fuess_Gropp_JFQA_12-12967.ashx on data source, index 
constituents, and representativeness. 7 
counterparties sustain heavy losses. This may lead to further defaults or threaten systemically 
important institutions not only directly as counterparties or creditors but also indirectly through 
asset price adjustments (Bernanke (2006)). It is unlikely, however, that the systemic relevance of 
hedge funds is due to high leverage alone. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) highlight the 
importance of market liquidity and funding liquidity. In particular, hedge funds provide liquidity 
to otherwise illiquid markets as long as access to credit is easy. However, traders are concerned 
about margin calls and avoid high margin positions when funding liquidity dries up. At that 
point, prices are more driven by funding liquidity considerations rather than by movements in 
fundamentals. The high exposure of hedge funds to changes in liquidity causes endogenous risk, 
triggered by selling pressure, to set off further downward pressure on asset prices within the 
financial system. This feedback loop is amplified by the risk management tools themselves 
which send selling signals on the same assets in many institutions simultaneously (Danielsson 
and Shin (2003)). 
While the literature generally tends to agree that hedge funds are systemically important 
and that this importance is likely to increase in the future (Danielsson, Taylor, and Zigrand 
(2005), Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005), Kambhu, Schuermann, and Stiroh (2007), and Chan et 
al. (2006), among others), our study is the first that provides empirical estimates of the size of 
intra-month spillover effects from hedge funds to other financial institutions. In this sense we 
complement a recent paper by Billio et al. (2011), who investigate the interconnectedness among 
financial institutions using monthly data. While they also find that insurance companies, banks, 
brokers, and hedge funds have become highly interrelated over the past decade, they focus on 
longer term relationships and they do not attempt to trace the transmission of shocks through the 
system of financial institutions. Using daily data, we show that the majority of the spillover 8 
effects are effective within one month, reaching their peak after 10 to 15 days. These intra-month 
effects remain unobservable to empirical studies based on a monthly data frequency. 
Methodologically the paper is related to Capiello, Gérard, and Manganelli (2005), and 
Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2010) who apply quantile regression for binary dependent variable 
models in order to measure contagion effects among hedge fund styles.
4 Similarly, Chan et al. 
(2006) and more recently Billio, Getmansky, and Pelizzon (2009) propose a regime-switching 
framework to estimate the probabilities of switching to a “systemic risk regime”. The joint 
distribution of hedge fund returns is studied by Brown and Spitzer (2006) who measure the 
dependence structure between hedge fund strategies using copulae. While the first two studies 
estimate the effects on state probabilities rather than the size of spillover effects, the latter study 
provides estimates on the tail-dependence structure without presenting empirical estimates of the 
magnitude of potential risk spillovers.
5 
The paper also complements a growing literature that examines the actual channels of 
transmission between financial institutions in general and from hedge funds to the financial 
system in particular, an issue that we leave unexplored in this paper. However, the majority of 
that literature examines contagion and systemic risk within the banking sector only. The main 
findings on systemic risk generating factors are thereby the growth in credit risk transfers 
(Hakenes and Schnabel (2010), Altunbas, Gambacorta, and Marquez-Ibanez, (2010)), investor 
sentiments (Shleifer and Vishny (2009), Hott (2009)), and the interaction of liquidity shortages 
                                                 
4 Another interesting study that seems to be relevant in our context is the recent working paper by White, 
Kim, and Manganelli (2010) who propose a computationally intensive generalization of Engle and Manganelli’s 
CAViaR model. 
5 In fact, the general belief in 2005 was that “current state-of-the-art methods do not allow us to capture the 
systemic risk component of a hedge fund’s position” (see Danielsson, Taylor, and Zigrand (2005)). 9 
and solvency problems among banks (Diamond and Rajan (2005)).
6 Gropp, Lo Duca, and Vesala 
(2009), and Gropp and Moerman (2004), as well as Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2006) 
show that distress in one banking system transmits across national borders to other banking 
systems. Brownlees and Engle (2010) and Acharya et al. (2010) propose marginal expected 
shortfall (MES) and systemic expected shortfall (SES) as measures of systemic risk and 
indicators of financial crises. Implications of financial fragility for the real economy are analyzed 
by Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) who find evidence that constrained firms bypass 
attractive investment opportunities and are forced to sell more assets to fund their operations. 
Furthermore, sectors that are highly dependent on external financing also suffer the greatest 
adverse impact on value added during banking crises (Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel 
(2007)).
7 
A few recent studies also provide evidence of contagion in the insurance industry. Allen 
and Gale (2005) argue that the considerable growth in the transfer of credit risk across sectors of 
the financial system has led to a shift in risk from the banking sector to the insurance sector. 
Fenn and Cole (1994) investigate the contagion effects among life insurance companies when 
major insurance companies report significant write downs of their portfolios. Negative wealth 
effects on shareholders of other insurance companies are shown to be particularly strong if the 
write downs refer to junk bonds or commercial mortgages. 
                                                 
6 One interesting aspect of the study by Hott (2009) is that uninformed “mood investors” may create a price 
bubble even in the absence of speculation. 
7 Another implication of these findings is that full diversification may in fact not be desirable. Although it 
reduces each institution’s individual probability of failure it also increases the probability of systemic risk (see 
Wagner (2010)). 10 
Finally, our approach is complementary to studies that are confined to estimating the 
average impact on the response variable like, e.g., Halstead, Hegde, and Klein (2005), who use 
an event study approach to estimate contagion effects from hedge funds during the LTCM crisis 
in 1998, or Ding et al. (2009), who investigate fund flows during periods of financial distress.
8 
 
III.  A State-Dependent Sensitivity VaR Model 
Our approach requires estimating value-at-risk measures for four financial institutions 
which in turn are used as inputs in a quantile regression. This might seem unnecessary technical 
given the standard practice of measuring co-movements among firms and assets with return 
correlations. However, return correlations are insufficient for our purpose. In order to obtain 
meaningful spillover estimates, one must be able to identify the direction of spillovers from one 
set of institutions to another and delineate them from shocks affecting all financial institutions 
simultaneously. Correlation coefficients, which by definition are symmetric, do not permit such 
identification. As a benchmark, consider Table 1 which shows the correlations of daily returns 
and squared daily returns (in brackets) among the four sets of financial institutions considered in 
this paper for the pre-crisis period from April 2003 to June 2007 and the crisis period from July 
2007 to July 2009. 
<< Table 1 about here >> 
As expected, correlation coefficients increase from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, at 
least among commercial banks, insurance companies, and investment banks. However, the 
increase tends to be relatively small, at least compared to some of the results we obtain below. 
                                                 
8 In these studies the response variable is abnormal stock market returns and hedge fund flows, respectively. 
The response variable in our study is the value-at-risk of different financial institutions and the hedge fund industry. 11 
Further, the return correlations between hedge funds and the other three sets of institutions tend 
to decline in the crisis, which may lead one to conclude that hedge funds were innocuous in 
transmitting shocks in the crisis. This finding is also robust to using weekly and monthly 
frequencies (not reported) and also holds for correlations of squared returns, i.e. non-linear 
dependency (in brackets). Taking feedback effects into account and identifying the direction of 
spillover effects will let us reach very different conclusions below. Our model yields spillover 
effects that increase by a factor of about 7 from tranquil to volatile times and suggest a central 
role in the transmission of shocks of hedge funds in volatile periods. 
The value-at-risk (VaR) is a risk measure with the appealing property of expressing the 
risk in only one number. Its intuitive interpretation and regulatory importance has led to general 
acceptance and wide application for internal and external purposes. From a statistical standpoint, 
estimation of the VaR requires adequate modeling of the time-varying distribution of returns.
9 In 
the past, a vast variety of different approaches have been applied, including GARCH (Bollerslev 
(1986)), extreme value theory (Danielson and De Vries (2000)), conditional autoregressive VaR 
(Engle and Manganelli (2004)), and simulation based methods (Barone-Adesi and Giannopoulos 
(2000)). The 2007-2009 financial crisis, however, has further highlighted the importance of 
accounting for the dependence of a VaR measure of one financial institution i on the VaR of 
some other institution  j  and, perhaps, on the VaR of the entire financial system.
10 
                                                 
9 In the multivariate VaR context, additional attention has to be devoted to the tail dependencies of the joint 
density of returns. 
10 We will refer at several points in this paper to the term “financial institution” but this generally 
corresponds to an index of single companies, representing each type of institution (commercial banks, investment 
banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies). 12 
To derive the SDSVaR approach, we start with the standard value-at-risk of a single type 
of financial institution. The value-at-risk is the estimated loss of a financial institution that, 
within a given period (usually 1 to 10 days), will be exceeded with a certain probability  
(usually 1% or 5%). Thus, the 1-day 5%-VaR shows the negative return that will not be 
exceeded within this day with a 95% probability, 
(1)  tt t prob return Var        . 
Recently, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) propose CoVaR as a measure for the contribution of 
a financial institution to systemic risk. This conditional VaR measure incorporates the additional 
risk in financial institution i caused by institution  j being in distress. If the focus is on 
macroprudential bank regulation, institution i is taken to be the financial system. A substantial 
difference between institution  j’s CoVaR and its VaR measure then indicates significant 
contribution of this institution to general systemic risk. Consequently, this should result in higher 
capital surcharges for systemic risk enhancing institutions. 
The CoVaR uses the same conceptual approach as VaR, i.e. 
tt t prob return CoVar       . However, the information set  t   not only includes the own 
past return history, i.e.     ,1 ,2 0 ,, , ti t i t i VaR r r r    , but also the VaR of another institution j: 
(2)     ,1 ,2 0 , ,, , , ti t i t i j t CoVaR r r r VaR   Using quantile regression, the CoVaR is estimated 
by regressing the %-quantile of the return distribution of institution i on a constant and the 
returns of institution j,  j R . The CoVaR between institutions i and j is then given by the fitted 
values from this regression: 13 
(3)  ,, ˆ ˆ ˆ ij i j j CoVaR R VaR VaR      where  i R  is the time series of institution i returns. In 
order to model the condition that institution j is in distress the returns from institution j,  j R , are 
replaced by the fitted values of institution j’s value-at-risk,  j VaR . 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) extend Equation (3) by adding a set of lagged regressors 
1 t M   that capture liquidity risk, market risk, and credit risk, thus generating a flexible risk 
measure that reacts sensitively to the underlying return process.
11 In Equation (3) the spillover 
coefficient  ˆ   is an average over all states of the economy. In this paper, we examine whether  , 
which measures the spillover intensity of  j VaR  on  i VaR , depends on the state of the economy. 
We hypothesize that during normal market times   may be of little economic significance, 
while the spillover effect becomes very important during times of financial distress. 
We propose a two-step approach to estimate the spillover coefficients  . In contrast to the 
CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), which relies on quantile regression to model 
the distribution of returns (see Koenker and Bassett (1978), Koenker (2005)), the SDSVaR 
proposed in this paper models the distribution of the value-at-risk. This has important 
consequences for the interpretation of our results. In the CoVaR model, the quantile  is set to 
low values such as 1% or 5%. The result is a VaR estimate from the quantiles of the return 
distribution. The way the VaR of one institution affects the VaR of another, i.e. the spillover 
coefficients, are assumed to be the same whether markets go through a tranquil period or are hit 
by a recession. In our approach we obtain the value-at-risk in a preceding step which allows us to 
                                                 
11 The estimating equation in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) is  ,, ,
1
system system j system j j system j
tt t R RM      , 
where the regressor set 
1 t M   consists of weekly financial market variables such as liquidity spread and stock market 
volatility, and  system
t R  is measured with the returns of the entire financial system. 14 
regress the VaRs over the whole range of quantiles.
12 The important point is that movements in 
the VaR change with the financial health of an institution. During tranquil market times, when 
institutions have plenty of cushions to absorb shocks, risk spillovers between financial 
institutions are likely to be marginal. During this market phase the VaR is close to zero (i.e., at 
high quantiles of the VaR distribution) and shows little variation. For stock prices of financial 
institutions this was generally the case during the time period of 2003–2005. When the financial 
crisis hit in 2007 the behavior of the VaR changed dramatically. The higher risk faced in the 
market not only send the VaR strongly negative (i.e., to low quantiles of the VaR distribution), 
but also caused the VaR to be more volatile. During this period dormant linkages that were 
building up during tranquil periods became suddenly visible and led to high spillovers between 
institutions. By modeling different quantiles of the VaR distribution we can measure how the 
response of institutions to shocks in another institution changes with the state of the market. 
Thus, while the 5%-quantile of the return distribution is the value-at-risk, low quantiles of the 
VaR distribution constitute the VaR during times of financial distress. The former step is 
necessary to obtain the desired risk measure, but it is the latter that introduces state dependency 
into the model. 
The first step in our model setup is to estimate the VaRs of all systemically relevant 
financial institutions, each covered by an index of several firms, separately: 
(4)  
,, ˆˆ m mt mt VaR z     
                                                 
12 We estimate Equation (5) for three different quantiles with  = {0.125, 0.5, 0.75}, where low, medium, and 
high VaR quantiles describe volatile, normal, and tranquil states of financial markets. 15 
with  , ˆmt   as the mean of institution m at time t.
13 In the following we consider four financial 
institutions, so that m = i, j, k, and l. It has become practice to model  , ˆmt   by extracting the 
conditional standard deviation from a GARCH model (Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006)). 
This will account for the time-varying volatility of returns and leads to substantial improvements 
in the sensitivity of the VaR to changes in the return process. We will therefore follow this 
practice.
14 
In a second step,  
m VaR  now becomes the dependent variable and is modeled by its own lag 
and the VaR measures of the other three sets of institutions. In order to interpret the spillover 
coefficients in a causal way the equations also include the following three control variables: The 
VaR of the general U.S. REIT index, the VaR of the GSCI Commodity index, and the VaR of an 
                                                 
13 The mean  , ˆmt   can be estimated in a rolling window. In practice, however, the variation in  , ˆmt   is dwarfed 
by the variation in the volatility and does not contribute to the overall variation in VaR. For simplicity, we therefore 
resort to a constant overall mean. 
14 For most of our return series volatility responds more strongly to negative return changes than to positive 
ones. To capture this fact we apply the asymmetric Exponential GARCH(1,1) of Nelson (1991) with a conditional t-
distribution for the error terms. As a robustness check, we also changed the specification along several dimensions. 
We compared symmetric and asymmetric GARCH models, changed the assumptions of the error distribution, and 
increased the number of lags of the EGARCH model. We also estimated our VaR series using the asymmetric slope 
version of Engle and Manganelli’s (2004) CAViaR model. The main conclusions derived in this paper are unaltered 
by these changes and the spillover coefficients are similar in size. One exception was the EGARCH(2,2) 
specification which led to increased spillover estimated during normal and tranquil market times but the additional 
parameterization was not justified according to the Schwarz Information Criterion. Note also that we use VaR 
instead of volatility as the former has a more direct interpretation. Technically, VaR is just a linear function of the 
volatility so that exactly the same spillover coefficients can be obtained using volatilities. To conserve space, we do 
not show the results here, however, they are available from the authors upon request. 16 
index of U.S. nonfinancial stocks. Although we are not interested in the coefficients of those 
variables, they ensure that our spillover effects are not contaminated by the exposure to a 
common factor. 
(5a)     
,, , , , , 1 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 1, , , it jt kt lt it it VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR u                    Ct VaR  
(5b)     
,, , 1 , , , 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 2, , , jt jt kt lt it j t VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR u                    Ct VaR  
(5c)      
,, , , 1 , , 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 3, , , kt jt kt lt it kt VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR u                    Ct VaR  
(5d)      
,, , , , 1 , 4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 4, , , lt jt kt lt it lt VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR u                    Ct VaR We 
allow the vector of control variables  C,t VaR  to have feedback effects with our financial 
institutions by modeling them in the same way, i.e. the full system has another three equations 
for the control variables which are omitted from the presentation of system (5) to improve 
readability. We estimate the parameters in (5) by two-stage quantile regression.
15 Like in the 
standard TSLS approach this method involves finding instruments for the endogenous variables 
on the right-hand side of the equation using OLS. The second stage, however, proceeds with 
estimating the parameters with quantile regression instead of OLS. We identify the system by 
assuming that the own lags,  
,1 mt VaR   in Equation (5a-d), only affect the VaR of institutions m. 
Hence, our identifying assumption is that controlling for contemporaneous spillover effects from 
the other three sets of institutions, there is no additional spillover effect of the lagged VaR of the 
other institutions. All four coefficients for the own lagged VaR,  4,  ,  5,  ,  10,  , and  15,   in 
Equations (5a-d) are statistically significant at the one percent level and therefore constitute valid 
                                                 
15 See Powell (1983) for the derivation of the statistical properties of this estimator. 17 
instruments to identify the system.
16 Equations (5a-d) are the central equations in this paper and 
our interest lies in the estimates of the spillover coefficients    ,1 , 2 , 3 , ˆˆˆ ,, i      θ B , 
 ,6 , 7 , 8 , ˆˆˆ ,, j       θ B ,   ,9 , 1 1 , 1 2 , ˆˆˆ ,, k       θ B , and    , 13, 14, 16, ˆˆˆ ,, l      θ B , respectively.
17 
As we have motivated before, the quantiles  of the VaR can be interpreted as reflecting 
the state or condition of financial markets. Note that quantile regression models the conditional 
quantile of the left-hand side variable, and not of the regressors. Accordingly, we estimate the 
spillovers conditioning on the financial health of the institution receiving the spillovers. This 
follows our intuition that financial institutions react more strongly to shocks when they are 
already weakened. The collapse of a large bank may leave other banks in the system unharmed 
during normal market times but can inflict substantial spillovers and distress during times of 
financial crisis.
18 When modeling spillover risk it seems natural that VaR measures are 
interdependent among financial institutions and that a set of observed VaR measures at a given 
                                                 
16 Second lag instruments,  
,2 it VaR  , 
,2 j t VaR  , 
,2 kt VaR  , and  
,2 lt VaR  , are insignificant and including them has no 
effect on the results. 
17 As a byproduct, the fitted values from system (5) give an extension of the common value-at-risk measure 
that explicitly accounts for the spillovers from other institutions. In the following section, we briefly present this 
extended VaR. However, our aim in this paper is not to improve the effectiveness of existing univariate VaRs in 
capturing daily volatility processes. Existing methods are sufficiently capable of this task (see Kuester, Mittnik, and 
Paolella (2006) for a comparison of univariate VaR measures). 
18 The value-at-risk graphs for all four financial institutions (not shown) exhibit very similar patterns over 
time so that the shock originating institution is generally in the same market state as the shock receiving institution. 
We also confirmed this finding in an expanded model that included binary variables indicating financial distress of 
the institutions on the right-hand side of the equation. To conserve space, we do not show the results here, however, 
they are available from the authors upon request. 18 
day are determined simultaneously. To address the bias that is introduced by this simultaneous 
framework, we use the common approach from TSLS to replace potentially endogenous right-
hand side variables by instruments obtained from lagged values. This additional effort is 
rewarded with consistent estimates that account for the fact that the VaRs of interdependent 
financial institutions are determined simultaneously.
19 
 
IV.  Measuring Spillover Effects among Financial Institutions 
A.  Data 
The subprime and financial crisis of 2007-2009 spread from mortgage-backed securities 
and CDOs to commercial banks and on to hedge funds and investment banks.
20 Credit risk has 
furthermore shifted from commercial banks to insurance companies (Allen and Gale (2005)). 
According to Greenlaw et al. (2008) USD 1.1 trillion of potential losses (of approximately USD 
1.4 trillion total reported subprime exposure) were borne by commercial banks, investment 
banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies. Consequently, we investigate the following four 
financial institutions using daily data for the time period 04/02/2003 to 12/31/2010 (2,023 
observations).
21 The findings in this paper do not change qualitatively if we use weekly instead 
of daily data. However, we cannot derive reliable VaR measures from monthly data due to the 
absence of significant ARCH effects when estimating conditional volatility. 
                                                 
19 Note that in two-stage quantile regression, like in TSLS, each equation is estimated separately. The state of 
the market is determined by the quantile of the left-hand side variable. 
20 See Brunnermeier (2008) for a comprehensive discussion of these linkages. 
21 A detailed description of all variables is given in the internet appendix available at 
http://www.sbf.unisg.ch/en/Lehrstuehle/Lehrstuhl_Fuess/Homepage_Fuess/~/media/Internet/Content/Dateien/Institu
teUndCenters/SBF/Papers/Internet_Appendix_Adams_Fuess_Gropp_JFQA_12-12967.ashx. 19 
We generally use principal component analysis for the index weighting but the results are 
not affected by this specific weighting approach. We reestimated the empirical results in this 
paper using equal weights for all four financial institutions and find very similar results. The 
indices of our four financial institutions are constructed as follows: 
1.  Commercial Bank Index (26 institutions): An index for the U.S. commercial banking 
sector. Constituents are taken from Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson 
(henceforth APPR) (2010). Note that the index contains also a few large banks such as 
Citigroup and Bank of America. We are aware of the fact that many large banks 
including Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, and Deutsche Bank generate income 
from both, commercial and investment banking. Accordingly, the classification of these 
institutions contains some degree of arbitrariness. However, the empirical results in this 
study are generally unaffected by any overlaps between the two groups. The index 
weights are estimated with principal component analysis. 
2.  Insurance Company Index (31 institutions): The constituents for this index are also taken 
from APPR (2010) and index weights are estimated with principal component analysis. 
3.  Investment Bank Index (8 institutions): The investment bank index was created from the 
main 8 publicly listed investment banks. We used again principal component analysis for 
generating the index weights. 
4.  Hedge Fund Index (47 institutions): The Hedge Fund Research Equally Weighted 
Strategies Index is comprised of all eligible hedge fund strategies.
22 The HFRX index 
family is an investable index based on information derived from managed accounts for 
                                                 
22 Another potential candidate for a composite index is the HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index. The empirical 
results using the Global Hedge Fund index are similar and yield the same qualitative conclusions. 20 
single hedge funds with the longest real track record, i.e. the maximal numbers of 
observations. The composite as well as the style indices cover the most liquid and largest 
single hedge funds in terms of assets under management (AUM). Because the return data 
are not self-reported, self-selection bias is not an issue. Furthermore, the index has not 
been calculated back (backfilling bias) and does not suffer from survivorship bias. The 
HFRX Equally Weighted Index contains 47 hedge funds and, although similar, is not 
fully representative of the overall hedge fund universe.
23 In short, we compare monthly 
return distributions and time series properties of the HFRX index and a truly 
representative index. The HFRX index closely follows the development of an index 
derived from a hedge fund universe. Thus, although the HFRX index may be 
contaminated with a measurement error, the bias from using the HFRX is likely to be 
small. 
B.  Baseline Results 
In this section, we present the results for estimating Equation (5). We are particularly 
interested in the spillover coefficient vector  θ Β . The estimation uses the sample period from 
04/02/2003 to 12/31/2010 (2,023 observations) in order to cover tranquil, normal, and volatile 
market periods. We choose the 75%-quantile for tranquil market conditions, the 50%-quantile for 
normal market conditions, and the 12.5%-quantile for conditions of financial distress.
24 
                                                 
23 A detailed discussion of the differences and their implications for our empirical findings can be found in 
the internet appendix available at 
http://www.sbf.unisg.ch/en/Lehrstuehle/Lehrstuhl_Fuess/Homepage_Fuess/~/media/Internet/Content/Dateien/Institu
teUndCenters/SBF/Papers/Internet_Appendix_Adams_Fuess_Gropp_JFQA_12-12967.ashx. 
24 The choice of specific quantiles introduces a certain degree of arbitrariness in our model. During tranquil 
market times risk spillovers are generally close to zero so that the choice of a specific upper quantile has no 21 
Figure 1 shows the slopes of the spillover coefficient for different quantiles. While we 
discuss all spillover coefficients below, in the upper graph of Figure 1 we exemplarily present 
the effects from changes in the aggregate hedge fund VaR on the VaR of investment banks in 
order to demonstrate the importance of permitting different coefficients during different phases 
of the market.
25 
<< Figure 1 about here >> 
The solid black regression line shows the spillover coefficient of Equation (3) as implied 
by the CoVaR model of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010). Note how the slope of this line shows 
some average spillover effect but slopes are estimated to be much flatter during tranquil market 
periods (lighter dashed lines) and much steeper during volatile market phases (darker dashed 
lines). The CoVaR model would estimate the slope of the spillover effects from the hedge funds’ 
VaR to the VaR of investment banks to be about 0.09. This corresponds to the straight black line 
in the lower graph of Figure 1.
26 If we interpret this situation as normal market conditions, it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
significant effect on the results. It is also plausible to choose the 50%-quantile for normal market times. Our 
empirical results, however, react more sensitively to quantile changes for volatile market periods. In this context, the 
choice of the 12.5%-quantile reflects the trade-off between measuring the tails of the VaR distribution where the 
largest spillovers occur and an increasing exposure to outliers due to a decreasing number of observations. In section 
IV. D. we therefore present the changes on the results from using a 15%- and a 10%-quantile model. 
25 Similar pictures can be seen for other combinations of financial institutions. The scatter plot above, 
however, is most suitable for demonstrating the effects of state dependencies. Furthermore, our empirical results in 
the next section suggest that shocks from the hedge fund industry are of particular importance. 
26 This slope estimate is based on a regression of the investment banking sector’s VaR on a constant and the 
VaR of the other three financial institutions (see Equation 5). In contrast, the two-dimensional scatter plot 
corresponds to a simple regression with only one regressor and is used to highlight the importance of state-
dependency rather than showing the results from our estimation equation. 22 
striking to see the slope of this coefficient to be almost three times higher during market 
conditions of financial distress. Similarly, the spillover effects are close to zero during tranquil 
markets. 
In order to obtain directional spillover effects, Equation (5) is estimated as a system for our 
four financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance 
companies) and for the three control variables (REITs, commodities, and non-financial stocks). 
We obtain a different set of coefficient estimates for each of the three market states (tranquil, 
normal, and volatile). Table 2 shows the results for the spillover coefficients and the 
autoregressive term from system (5). Shocks are originating from the financial institutions 
denoted in the columns of the table and subsequently spill over to the institution denoted in the 
rows of the table.
27 For instance, an increase in the VaR of hedge funds by one percent increases 
the VaR of investment banks by 0.087% during normal market periods. During a crisis this 
spillover effect is estimated to be 0.707%, i.e. 8 times higher. Ignoring state-dependency as in the 
case of the CoVaR model from Equation (3) therefore leads to substantial underestimation of 
spillover effects. Note that the standard errors in Table 2 are not only determined by the 
sampling error in the quantile regression framework but also by the uncertainty within the VaRs 
themselves which depend on the EGARCH coefficients. To obtain correct standard errors for 
Table 2 we apply the maximum entropy bootstrap of Vinod and López-de-Lacalle (2009) which 
addresses the time-series properties within each financial institution but also retains the 
dependency characteristics between our four institutions. This technique is used on the raw data 
to produce 200 bootstrapped versions of Table 2 from which the upper and lower quantiles can 
be directly determined. 
                                                 
27 To save space, Table 2 does not show the risk spillovers to the control variables. 23 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
Table 2 shows that shocks to hedge funds also have some effect on the VaR of insurance 
companies, and to some extent on commercial banks. Hedge funds and investment banks show 
some degree of interdependence. During volatile market periods, a one percent increase in the 
VaR of investment banks leads to a 0.007% increase in the VaR of hedge funds. Every 
percentage point increase in the VaR of hedge funds in turn has feedback effects in the order of 
0.707%. We also find that commercial banks increasingly affect insurance companies moving 
from tranquil to volatile market periods. These results are in line with Allen and Gale (2005) 
who argue that credit risk has been considerably transferred from the banking sector to insurance 
companies. In terms of spillover coefficient size, however, we conclude from Table 2 that hedge 
funds play a major role in the transmission of shocks to other financial institutions. 
This finding should not come unexpected as recent work directly or indirectly points to 
hedge funds as major contributors of systemic risk. For instance, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) show that hedge funds are an important source of market liquidity if funding liquidity is 
high, but traders are less willing to hold high margin positions once funding liquidity declines. 
King and Maier (2009) stress excessive leverage in combination with herding behavior as an 
important source of intra hedge fund spillovers. With high leverage, even moderate price swings 
can force hedge funds to liquidate positions in order to meet margin calls. The high levels of 
leverage and similarity in investment strategies set off a feedback loop where adverse price 
moves result in liquidations (Danielsson and Shin (2003)). One interpretation for the findings in 
Table 2 may be that when major prime brokers experienced financial distress in 2008-2009, 24 
hedge funds were the first to be affected by margin calls and a tightening of credit availability.
28 
This had a significant negative impact on the funding and the asset side of hedge funds during 
market downturn. As a consequence, risk spillovers among hedge funds arose and affected the 
entire hedge fund industry. Because hedge funds and banks are interconnected, the failure of 
hedge funds leads to capital losses among investment banks (Klaus and Rzepkowska (2009)). 
Note that our results do not imply that major shocks during the 2007-2009 financial crisis 
originated in the hedge funds industry and subsequently spread to other institutions. Indeed, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that some hedge fund distress was caused by increasing margins set 
by prime brokers. Our findings indicate however that shocks in the hedge fund industry (coming 
from prime brokers or any other source) did not stay in the hedge fund industry. Instead, and this 
is what seems to be a distinct feature of hedge funds, shocks to hedge funds were amplified and 
lead to severe spillovers to other financial institutions, in particular to investment banks.
29 
                                                 
28 To give an example, in an article from the 23
rd October 2008 The Economist reports that “In Europe many 
funds found that the assets they pledged as collateral in return for financing from Lehman have become trapped in 
the bankruptcy process as administrators strain to work out which assets genuinely belong to clients. Worse still, 
many assets have simply disappeared, thanks to a standard industry practice called “rehypotecation”, in which prime 
brokers use clients’ collateral to raise financing of their own.” 
29 Much of hedge fund distress was caused by investor’s mass redemptions during the crisis period. We also 
estimated a version of Table 2 that includes as an exogenous variable the in- and outflows of funds to the aggregate 
hedge fund industry. This variable was only available in monthly frequency so that our results are hardly definitive. 
Based on these estimates, however, the flows variable was economically and statistically insignificant. The results 
are available from the authors upon request. 25 
Table 2 also shows the coefficients of the autoregressive term which are estimated to be 
close to one.
30 Note that although VaR measures are known to move wildly during crisis periods, 
the autoregressive structure is actually stronger during this time.
31 
Comparing the correlations reported in Table 1 to the results based on the SDSVaR model 
reported in Table 2, we find two striking differences. First, while the correlations do tend to 
increase in the crisis, the increase is much smaller than the increases in spillover coefficients 
estimated using SDSVaR. Relying on correlations may substantially underestimate the 
externality of one set of financial institutions on another set during times of financial distress. 
Second, the SDSVaR results suggest a much more prominent role for hedge funds as institutions 
that tend to generate significant spillover effects for other financial institutions. The differences 
are due to the fact that the SDSVaR model eliminates correlation that arise due to all financial 
institutions being hit by the same common shock and isolates the spillover effects. The spillover 
effects can be interpreted as evidence in the spirit of endogenous risk as recently proposed by 
                                                 
30 In the presence of serially correlated disturbances the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable leads to 
biased coefficient estimates. Inspection of the regression residuals showed only little or no autocorrelation with 
values generally below 0.15. 
31 Some coefficients are estimated to be slightly above one. This might raise some concerns about the 
stationarity properties of the VaR series. An economic interpretation would be that if, over a period of time, each 
day is dominated by negative returns, the VaRs of financial institutions respond by turning more negative each day. 
What is typically observed, however, are return series showing alternating patterns of negative and positive changes 
so that negative shocks with lag coefficients above one are followed by positive shocks with coefficients below one. 
Thus, after a shock, the VaR quickly returns to more stable environments rather than increasing indefinitely. Finally, 
the VaR is directly tied to the return series which in turn is stationary. 26 
Dannielsson and Shin (2003) and Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2009) and represent an 
amplification of the initial shock to the system.
32 
 
C.  Time-Varying Coefficient Estimates and One-Step-Ahead Forecasts 
In this section, we estimate the SDSVaR as a series of one-step-ahead forecasts using a 
rolling window of 500 trading days. This requires estimating the SDSVaR for different quantiles 
and selecting the quantile model that best represents the economic conditions at time t. For 
instance, a SDSVaR model with coefficient estimates that correspond to the lower tail of the left-
hand side VaR distribution is applied during times of financial distress. In this situation, a 
forecast incorporates the “coefficients of the crisis” rather than some average measure which 
may not be representative of the dependence structure during this time.
33 
We obtain the SDSVaR as the fitted values from Equations (5a-d). For instance, the 
SDSVaR of institution i, 
,, ijkl SDSVaR  can be expressed as: 
(6)   
,,, , , , , , 1 1, 2, 3, 4, ˆˆˆˆ ˆ ijkl t jt kt lt it SDSVaR VaR VaR VaR VaR                
Graph A of Figure 2 shows the SDSVaR for investment banks with spillovers from 
insurance companies, commercial banks, and the hedge fund industry for the period 02/28/2005 
                                                 
32 We also tested the spillover effects of different hedge fund strategies (see the internet appendix for details). 
Our results suggest that the importance of hedge funds in generating spillover effects to other financial institutions is 
not necessarily due to the convergence of hedge fund styles during volatile times. 
33 The short memory in the autoregressive structure of the SDSVaR model lends itself to one-step-ahead 
forecasts whereas multi-step-ahead forecasts will quickly loose in efficiency. The forecast performance will also 
depend on the stability of the current economic condition. 27 
to 12/31/2010 (1,525 observations).
34 For comparison, the graph also shows the performance of 
the CoVaR model. While both, the CoVaR and the SDSVaR are very similar during calm market 
periods, the CoVaR is less sensitive to extreme risk during downward markets. In contrast to 
other common VaR methods, such as the normal VaR, however, both VaR models react to 
changes in the underlying return process and indicate a high level of risk during the crisis period 
of 2008 and the first half of 2009.
35 In this respect, the SDSVaR is also quite similar to 
established flexible VaR measures, such as the GARCH-type VaR or the CAViaR model of 
Engle and Manganelli (2004). In fact, recent studies show that these univariate VaR models are 
already very efficient so that room for improvements is marginal at best (Kuester, Mittnik, and 
Paolella (2006)). The contribution of the SDSVaR model to the body of existing VaR techniques 
is that (i) it explicitly reveals the magnitude of the spillover at time t, and (ii) it provides useful 
information for scenario analysis in asking questions such as “how will a shock to the hedge fund 
industry affect a certain asset class or a group of financial institutions?”
36 
<< Figure 2 about here >> 
Graph B of Figure 2 shows the changes in spillover coefficients   Β  and their 
corresponding 95% error bands for a rolling 500 trading day window. From left to right, this 
graph shows the risk spillovers from insurance companies, commercial banks, and hedge funds 
on the VaR of investment banks. In line with our previous findings investment banks are only 
                                                 
34 Note that a foregoing training sample is required to obtain the necessary information for estimating the first 
entry in the series of spillover coefficients. The estimation period therefore does not start in 04/02/2003 as before but 
500 days later. 
35 See for instance Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) for a comparison of GARCH-type VaR and normal VaR. 
36 We will answer these kinds of questions in subsection IV. D. below when we model the dynamic effects of 
a one-time shock using impulse response functions. 28 
marginally affected by insurance companies and commercial banks but react strongly to changes 
in the VaR of hedge funds. For these institutions risk spillovers remain close to zero during 
tranquil market periods and are generally below 0.7 for normal market phases. During crisis 
periods, however, the magnitude of risk spillovers increases markedly with coefficients for the 
lower 12.5%-quantile being often more than twice the size of the spillovers during normal 
market phases. The two standard deviation error bands show that the effects are also significant 
during most of the sample period. Note that the backward looking 500-days rolling window 
causes the coefficients to react with a lag. For instance, coefficient estimates that are based on a 
sample window with its 500
th observation in the first half of 2008 reflect the time before 
investment banks were in distress. However, coefficients will start to respond to the new 
circumstances as the crisis period becomes a significant part of the rolling window. Thus, the 
sharp rise in hedge fund spillovers during 2009 in fact reflects occurrences from the second half 
of 2008 when the investment banks were first hit by the financial crisis. 
 
D.  Feedback Effects and Persistence of Risk Spillovers 
The risk spillover estimates from the preceding section marked the responses of financial 
institutions within the same day. If institutions are in fact interdependent and shocks are 
persistent it would seem reasonable (i) to expect reactions to the initial shock to last over a 
longer period of time and (ii) to observe feedback effects among these institutions. In this 
section, we address this issue by employing impulse response functions that show the dynamic 
behavior of a system of SDSVaRs in the presence of a one-time shock to one financial 
institution. 29 
Computation of the IRFs is done as in a classical vector autoregression estimated from 
OLS. The only difference is that we do not have one coefficient matrix but three (one for each 
quantile) and hence three different responses. The IRFs are orthogonalized using the standard 
Cholesky decomposition. Since we have no theoretic guidance for a possible ordering of our 
variables, we choose the most conservative approach of ordering the shock transmitting variable 
last. This means that we restrict the responses such that the shocked variable only affects itself at 
time t but generates no contemporaneous spillovers (the first spillovers start in time t+1). While 
this approach means that our IRFs are potentially downward biased, they can be regarded as the 
smallest estimated response given a shock to one financial institution. More importantly, we 
mitigate the problem of an ad-hoc ordering by treating all variables equally. 
Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions for tranquil, normal, and volatile market 
conditions. This corresponds to  being equal to the 75%-, the 50%-, and the 12.5%-quantiles of 
institution  i’s value-at-risk distribution over the period 04/02/2003 to 12/31/2010 (2,023 
observations), respectively. We shock each financial institution in turn (the order from left to 
right being insurance companies, commercial banks, investment banks, and hedge funds) and 
observe the response from the other three institutions. The size of the immediate response 
depends on the size of the spillover estimates in Table 2,    1, 2, 16, ˆˆ ˆ ,, ,       θ B  , whereas the 
persistence of the response depends on both, the spillover size   B  as well as the size of the own 
lag, (for example  4, ˆ
   in Equation (5a)). The VaRs of the financial institutions therefore show 
larger responses for low quantile states during which the distress coefficients are used to 
compute the response. 
Each series is shocked once in the order of one standard deviation. During calm market 
periods, none of the shocks to the VaR measures of any of the four financial institutions leads to 30 
significant spillovers to the VaRs of other institutions. This supports our hypothesis that risk 
spillovers only take place under distressed market conditions but do not pose a threat to the 
whole system when financial markets are in a stable condition. 
<< Figure 3 about here >> 
As we proceed towards more volatile market conditions, we can to some extent observe 
risk spillovers from commercial banks to insurance companies. The most striking effects, 
however, come from shocks to the hedge fund industry. They increase the absolute value of VaR 
for all other institutions even under market conditions in which shocks in other industries remain 
unnoticed. During times of extreme volatility, however, shocks from hedge funds have 
substantial effects on all of the remaining three institutions. The largest impact can be observed 
for the VaR of the investment bank sector, for which the response is estimated to be around 
three-quarters the size of the initial shock to the hedge fund industry. In fact, for very low 
quantiles the crisis coefficients do not lead back to a steady state so that the responses are 
explosive. This simply reflects the fact that if, over a period of time, each day would be 
dominated by extreme negative shocks, the VaRs of financial institutions would respond by 
turning more negative each day. We therefore return to the normal market state coefficients after 
the day of the shock. We believe this setting to be reasonable. Even during a financial crisis 
extreme negative shocks only occur over a few days but generally lead to volatility clustering 
containing also positive returns. This also has implications for commercial banks’ shock 
response over time. During normal market times, commercial banks have the largest lag 
coefficient (0.979). In addition, normal times risk spillovers from hedge funds are estimated to 
be the largest for commercial banks. As a consequence, shocks in the banking sector are more 
persistent with only about 50% of the initial shock being adjusted after three months. Note also 31 
that part of the response of insurance companies is likely to be due to their exposure to both, 
hedge funds and commercial banks. 
Finally, the four graphs at the bottom of Figure 3 also show the effects of a 15%- and a 
10%-quantile model represented as upper and lower borders of the shaded bands around the 
12.5%-quantile estimates. The width of those bands suggests that the choice of a specific 
quantile may have some effect on the estimates for commercial banks but has only little effect on 
the results from the other three institutions. 
Our estimates concerning the duration of spillover effects also help to resolve an apparent 
conflict with other recent findings. For instance, Billio et al. (2011) find the returns of 
commercial banks and insurers to have a more significant impact on the returns of hedge funds 
and investment banks than vice versa. However, the authors estimate return spillover effects that 
occur between months. The majority of the risk spillover effects in our model, however, are 
effective within one month. These intra-month effects remain unobservable to empirical studies 
based on a monthly frequency. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk (SDSVaR) which 
measures spillover effects in a system of simultaneous equations conditional on the state of the 
economy. We estimate a system of quantile regressions for four sets of major financial 
institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies) using 
daily data. Conditioning on the state of financial markets (tranquil, normal, and volatile), we find 
the size and duration of risk spillovers among financial institutions to change substantially 
depending on the state of the market. While risk spillovers are small during normal times, 32 
equivalent shocks lead to considerable spillover effects during crisis times. For instance, during 
normal market times, a one percentage point increase in the VaR of hedge funds is estimated to 
increase the VaR of investment banks by 0.09 percentage points. The same shock, however, 
increases the VaR of the investment bank industry by 0.71 percentage points during times of 
financial distress. 
Our empirical results further show that, again during market distress, a one percent 
increase in the value-at-risk of the hedge fund industry leads to a 0.34% increase in the VaR of 
insurance companies and a 0.28% increase in the VaR of commercial banks. Using a set of 
impulse response functions, we trace out the responses of the same shocks over time and find 
that they reach their peak after 10 to 15 days. 
The SDS VaR approach developed in this paper permits a delineation of common shocks 
affecting all institutions simultaneously from “pure” spillover effects in a quantile regression 
setting. Comparing the results to simple time-varying correlations, we show that correlations 
may overstate spillovers in normal times and understate spillovers in volatile times. In addition 
we find that hedge funds may play an even more prominent role as transmission channels and 
amplifiers of systemic risk than previously thought. 
Although the SDSVaR model is useful for measuring and quantifying spillover effects, it 
does not explain the mechanisms underlying the estimated spillovers. In order to trace spillover 
effects back to economic relationships, rather than statistical ones, one would need much more 
detailed information on the exposures among different financial institutions, their asset holdings 
and their liability structure. In particular for hedge funds most of this information is currently 
unavailable. Hence, the findings support initiatives as in Lo (2008), who in his testimony for the 
U.S. House of Representatives emphasizes that hedge funds should be required to provide more 33 
information on a confidential basis to regulators, e.g., leverage, liquidity, counterparties, and 
holdings, in order to enable supervisors to more accurately assess the risks in the financial sector. 34 
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Figure 1: Value-at-Risk Scatter Plots and Quantile Effects for Selected Financial Institutions 
 
 
This Figure shows the slopes of the spillover coefficient  1   for various quantiles  . The coefficients show 
the response of the value-at-risk in the investment bank industry (denoted on the y-axis) to a shock 
originating in the hedge fund industry (denoted on the x-axis). The triangles in the scatter plot denote the 
lowest 5% of the investment bank’s VaR. For comparison, the figure also shows the average and thus state-
independent slope coefficient of the CoVaR model (thick line in the upper graph and horizontal solid line 
with 95% confidence interval in the lower graph). In contrast, values above the 75%-quantile are denoted as 
“upper quantiles”; values between the 12.5%-quantile and the 75%-quantile are denoted as “middle 
quantiles”; values below 12.5% are denoted as “lower quantiles”. 
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Figure 2: Dynamic SDSVaR Model for Investment Banks 
Graph A: Out-of-Sample Dynamic SDSVaR 
 
 
Graph B: Time-Varying Coefficients and Error Bands 
Spillovers from Insurance Comp.  Spillovers from Commercial Banks  Spillovers from Hedge Funds 
This figure shows the behavior and performance of the dynamic SDSVaR model for the period 03/01/2005 – 12/31/2010 (1,524 obs.). 
Graph A shows the series of rolling window one-step-ahead forecasts of the SDSVaR that measures the spillover effects from insurance 
companies, commercial banks, and hedge funds to investment banks. Graph B displays the dynamic behavior of the spillover coefficients 
over time for different states of the economy together with 95% confidence bands indicating the statistical significance of the estimates. 
The 75%-, 50%-, and 12.5%-quantile correspond to tranquil, normal, and volatile market periods, respectively. Because of the backward 
looking behavior of the 500-days rolling-window the coefficients reflect the distress period in 2008 with a lag. 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions for Tranquil, Normal, and Volatile Market Conditions 
Tranquil Market Conditions: 0.75-Quantile 
 
Normal Market Conditions: 0.5-Quantile 
 
Volatile Market Conditions: 0.125-Quantile 
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This figure shows how financial institutions respond to shocks originating from other institutions. The size of the shock of each series is one standard deviation. In addition to the size 
of the response, the impulse response functions also show how quickly institutions respond as well as how persistent the response is. The estimates are obtained from a seven-equation 
system (4 financial institutions and 3 control variables) using two-stage quantile regression. The Cholesky ordering is such that the shocked series comes last. This way, the impulse 
response functions show the most conservative spillover dynamics: the shocked series is assumed to have no spillover effects on the other three institutions in period t, i.e. spillovers 
start with a lag of one day. Ordering the series this way means our spillover estimates are likely to be downward biased. On the other hand, we avoid the problem of an ad-hoc ordering 
by treating all series equally. The observation period ranges from 04/02/2003 to 12/31/2010 (2,023 obs.). During volatile market conditions, the crisis coefficients are used only at the 
time of the shock in t0. In the following days, the model returns to the normal market times’ coefficients. The bottom four graphs show the response for the 0.125-quantile together with 
the 0.15-quantile response (upper border of the bands) and the 0.1-quantile response (lower border of the bands). 
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Insurance Companies Commercial Banks Investment Banks Hedge Funds44 
Table 1: Return and Squared Return Correlations among Financial Institutions 
  Insurance 
Companies 
Commercial
Banks 
Investment 
Banks 
Hedge 
Funds 
Pre-Crisis Period (04/01/2003–06/29/2007) 
Insurance Companies  1      
Commercial Banks  0.75 [0.53] 1     
Investment Banks  0.65 [0.41]  0.71 [0.60] 1   
Hedge Funds  0.43 [0.18]  0.40 [0.26]  0.59 [0.43] 1 
Crisis Period (07/01/2007–07/31/2009) 
Insurance Companies  1      
Commercial Banks  0.83 [0.68] 1     
Investment Banks  0.78 [0.72]  0.75 [0.56] 1   
Hedge Funds  0.28 [0.35]  0.12 [0.16]  0.38 [0.42] 1 
This table shows daily return correlations for the pre-crisis and the crisis period. The data series are 
discussed in detail in subsection IV. A.. Values in brackets denote correlations of squared returns. 
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Table 2: Coefficients of the Static SDSVaR Models 
  Spillover Coefficient   Β   Control Variables 
Lag  from... 
to… 
Insurance 
Companies 
Commercial 
Banks 
Investment
Banks 
Hedge 
Funds 
 
REITs Commodity  Stocks 
 Tranquil 
Insurance 
Companies  - 0.006
** 0.001  0.047
**   -0.003
** -0.001  -0.004
**  0.939
** 
Commercial 
Banks  -0.003 - 0.003
* 0.013
**   0.000  -0.001  0.003  0.958
** 
Investment 
Banks  0.012
** 0.005
** -  0.062
**   -0.007
** -0.002
*  -0.018
** 0.946
** 
Hedge 
Funds  0.001 0.000 0.001
* -    0.000 -0.001  -0.002
** 0.869
** 
 Normal 
Insurance 
Companies  - 0.020
** 0.004  0.074
**   -0.008
** 0.007
*  -0.009 0.943
** 
Commercial 
Banks  0.001 -  0.009
** 0.088
**   -0.007
** 0.004  -0.017
** 0.979
** 
Investment 
Banks  0.012
** 0.007
** -  0.087
**   -0.007
** -0.002  -0.013
** 0.957
** 
Hedge 
Funds  0.003
** -0.001
** 0.001
** -    0.000  -0.002
** -0.002  0.915
** 
  Volatile 
Insurance 
Companies  - 0.029
** 0.012  0.342
**   0.013
*  0.046
** -0.070
** 1.039
** 
Commercial 
Banks  0.047
**  - 0.045
** 0.278
**   0.026
** 0.023
*  -0.111
** 0.999
** 
Investment 
Banks  0.044
** 0.051
** -  0.707
**   -0.021
** 0.032  -0.098
** 0.999
** 
Hedge 
Funds  -0.007
** 0.004
** 0.007
** -    -0.001  -0.006
** -0.001  1.097
** 
This table shows the size of the coefficient estimates 
 Β  of Equations (5a-d). Institutions at the top of the table denote the origin of the 
shock, while the institutions in table rows denote the responding institution. Coefficients are estimated for tranquil, normal, and volatile 
market states. Market states are measured by the 75%-, 50%-, and the 12.5%-quantile of the value-at-risk distribution of the responding 
institution, respectively. For instance, a one percentage point increase in the VaR of hedge funds increases the VaR of investment banks by 
0.087 percentage points during normal market times. The same shock, however, increases the VaR of the investment bank industry by 0.707 
percentage points during volatile market phases. The estimation period is 04/02/2003 – 12/31/2010 (2,023 obs.). Standard errors are based 
on 200 bootstrap replicates and account for the fact that the regressors themselves are fitted values leading to additional uncertainty in 
parameter estimates. 
** and 
* denote significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
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